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RECENT DECISIONS
child to sue for the alienation of affections of his parents in a state where
the statute is in effect, it seems unreasonable to contend that the existence
of such statutes elsewhere indicates a public policy adverse to granting the
action in a jurisdiction where no such statute exists. Furthermore, the desira-
bility of such statutes has been strongly questioned. 22
The fact that there is no precedent for the action at common law is an
inadequate reason for leaving the problem to the legislature, as was done in
the principal case. Courts have recognized other causes of action in spite of
lack of precedent- for example, in cases of loss of consortium by a wife
because of a negligent injury to her husband,2 3 pre-natal injury,24 invasion
of the right of privacy,25 and intentional mental disturbance.26
That the child has a vital interest in the preservation of the integrity of
his home and family against unwarranted outside interference is dear.2 7
The Ohio court should have recognized the infant's right to recover in the
principal case under the coures power to expand the common law to
meet the needs of society. I
LARRY A. BROCK
INSURANCE- PROVISION FOR AGREEMENT THAT
AGENT'S KNOWLEDGE WILL NOT BE IMPUTED TO PRINCIPAL -
VALIDITY
In applying for an automobile insurance policy the applicant truth-
fully revealed to the agent of the insurance company that he had had
several minor accidents and a cancellation of insurance by a previous in-
surer. The agent wrote on the application that the car-owner had had
no cancellation and only "one small claim." The applicant signed the
application but claims that he did not know that false answers had been
'See 20 CORNELL L.Q. 255, 257 (1935).
'See Brown, The Action For Alienation of Affections, 82 U. OF PA. L. REv. 472,
505 (1934); Kane, Heart Balm and Public Policy, 5 FoRD. L. REv. 63 (1936);
Feinsinger, Current Legislation Affecting Breach of Promise to Marry, Alienation of
Affections, and Related Actions, 10 Wis. L. REv. 417 (1935)
'Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied 340 U.S.
852, 71 Sup. C. 80 (1950).
"'Jasinsky v. Potts, 153 Ohio St. 529, 92 N.E.2d 809 (1950); Williams v. Marion
Transit Co., 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E.2d 334 (-1949).
'Reed v. Real Detective Publishing Co., 63 Ariz. 294, 162 P.2d 133 (1945);
Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905); Friedman v.
Cincinnati Local Joint Executive Board, 6 Ohio Supp. (36 N.E.2d) 276, 20 Ohio
Op. 473 (1941).
"Prosser, TORTs § 11 (1941).
' See Pound, Individual Interests in the Domestic Relations, 14 ifcH. L. REv. 177,
185 (1916); Prosser, ToRTs § 101, p. 937 (1941). For statistical data demonstrat-
ing the reality of such an interest as manifested by the psychological disruption of
the child and economic loss to society caused by a broken home, see Note, 28 N.C.L.
REV. 397 (1950).
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inserted. The policy was issued and sent to the agent but never delivered
to the applicant because the company learned of the prior losses. Before
the company cancelled the policy, which cancellation occurred shortly
after its issuance, the driver had another accident. A provision in the
policy stated that no notice to an agent should estop the insurer from as-
serting any rights under the policy. In a suit by one claiming under the
insured's rights, the plaintiff claimed that the knowledge of the agent as
to the false answers was imputed to the insurance company and therefore
the company issued the policy with knowledge and could not take advan-
tage of any agreement whereby the policy was to be void if the application
proved false. Held, for the insurance company, because the limitation in
the policy effectively changed the common law rule that knowledge of an
agent received while acting within the scope of his authority and in ref-
erence to a matter over which bis authority extends is imputed to Ins
principal.1 Judge Taft, in the concurring opinion, stated that the limta-
tion was not only to be found in the p6licy, but also in the application,
because of the interpretation of a clause therein.
The three-judge dissent criticizes the majority opimon as harsh and
contrary to the weight of authority, pointing to the fact that the insured's
dealings are confined to the agent and rarely does the insured do more
than sign his name to the application.
Previous Ohio cases have questioned the wisdom of allowing a solicit-
ing agent 2 to deal with truthful applicants who rely on hin, only to have
the agent's authority limited by a provision in the policy subsequently
issued.3 These cases held, as did the court of appeals in the principal
case, that when the limitation appeared only in the policy it could affect
only knowledge gained subsequent to the issuance of the policy, but not
knowledge gained at the time of the application. Good public policy re-
quires that an insurance company holding an agent out as its representa-
tive should be bound by what he does, even if in excess of his actual
authority, for to the insured the agent is the company.4 In Mechamds &
'Fay v. Swicker, 154 Ohio St. 341, 96 N.E.2d 196 (1950)
2Otio GEN. CODE § 9586. Soliciting agent is agent of the insurance company
anything in the application or policy to the contrary notwithstanding. The majority
opimon held that this section established the fact of agency and not the scope.
'Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Glass, 117 Ohio St 145, 158 N.E. 93 (1927); Foster v.
Scottish Union & National Ins. Co., 101 Ohio St 180, 127 N.E. 865 (1920). With-
out discussing the affect of the position of the limitation, the majority in the prina-
pal case distinguished these cases on the fact that in both of them premiums had
been paid for many years, and the principal of equitable estoppel was applicable
without regard to the limitation. Under Judge Taft's view, since the application
also contained the limitation, only the question of public policy should remain.
'Lind v. State Automobile Mut. Ins. Ass'n., 128 Ohio St. 1, 11, 190 N.E. 138, 142
(1934) But see Republic Mut. Ins. Co. v. Faught, 83 Ohio App. 131, 82 N.E.2d
133 (1948); Peninston v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 7 Ohio Dec. Repr. 678 (1874).
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Traders Ins. v. Hemmelstzen, where a similar limitation was under con-
sideration, it was stated that the presumption that knowledge of an agent
is imputed to Is principal is thoroughly imbedded and the agency is so
irrevocably fixed that nothng in the terms of the application or policy
can invalidate it' The public policy and law fixing the insurer's liability
cannot be regarded as conferring a mere personal privilege which may be
waived by agreement 7
In Rhode Island Underwriter's Ass'n. v. Monarch,8 it was stated that
even though the principal may try to relieve himself of liability by limit-
ing the power of his agents through conditions in the policy, he can not
commission an agent to act for him in a given transaction and then seek
to avoid responsibility by denying that notice to the agent in such trans-
action is notice to the principal. Other courts reach the same result
without deciding the validity of such limitations, by holding as did previous
Ohio cases,10 that such limitations affect only knowledge gained subse-
quent to the issuance of the policy. 1
A few jurisdictions have held, in accord with the decision in the
principal case, that the insurance company could by contract abrogate
the common law rule that knowledge of the agent is imputed to the prin-
cipal.'2 Upon this theory, in Curry v. Washngton Nat. Ins. Co.,'5 re-
covery was demed on a policy when the insurer's agent had inserted false
answers in the application, even though the elderly, illiterate applicant
had honestly conveyed the answers to the agent. The federal courts have
generally upheld the freedom of insurer and insured to contract to avoid
'24 Ohio App. 29, 155 N.E. 806 (1926).
'Insurance statutes are a part of every insurance policy. John Hancock Mut. Life
Ins. Co. v. Snyder, 52 Ohio App. 438, 3 N.E.2d 898 (1935); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Houck, 32 Ohio App. 429 (1922).
"Queen Ins. Co. v. Leslie, 47 Ohio St. 409, 24 N.E. 1072 (1890)
'98 Ky. 305, 32 S.W 959 (1895).
'Helig v. Home Security Life Ins. Co., 222 N.C. 231, 22 S.E.2d 429 (1942);
accord, Union Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 193 Ark. 627, 101 S.W.2d 778 (1937). In-
surer may not contract with applicant against knowledge being imputed to company
from agent. Adams v. LaSalle Life Ins. Co., 99 S.W.2d 386 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936),
makes the distinction between the right of a principal to limit the authority of his
agent and is right to exempt himself from the effect of the knowledge acquired
by such agent in connection with the authority so conferred. But. cf. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co. v. Tannebaum, 240 S.W 2d 566 (Ky. 1951).
" See note 3 supra.
'Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Saxe, 134 F.2d 16 (4th Cir. 1943); Rhodes v.
Mutual Ben. Health and Accident Ass'n., 56 Ga. App. 728, 194 S.E. 33 (1937);
Lampke v. Metropolitan Ins. Co., 279 N. Y. 157, 18 N.E.2d 14 (1938)
"Kasmer v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 140 Pa. Super. 46, 12 A.2d 805 (1940);
Southern Surety Co. v. Benton, 280 S.W 551 (Tex. Com. App. 1926).
"56 Ga. App. 809, 194 S.E. 825 (1937).
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imputation of knowledge. 4 In passing upon Ohio General Code Section
9586, one federal decision stated that the statute established only the fact
of agency and not the scope, and that therefore the contract limitation
must prevail.15 Another court, seemingly forgetting that the validity of
the limitation was in issue, held that allowing the knowledge to be im-
puted would invalidly defeat the written contract by parol evidence of
prior statements of the insured to the agent.' These views have even
more support when the limitation is in the application, for then the in-
sured is charged with knowledge at the inception of the transaction, and
cannot daim, as he well might if the limitation were only in the policy,
that the application was answered before he had notice of the limitation.7
However, those cases in accord with the dissent in the principal case still
appear to be in the majority, for it makes no difference when the limita-
tion is brought to the applicant's attention if the limitation is nugatory
as contra public policy. 8 This is the view taken by eminent text writers
in criticizing such results as were reached in the principal case.1
Therefore this writer submits that where the limitation appears only
in the policy it should not affect the imputation of knowledge gained
prior to the issuance of the policy. Moreover, even where the limitation
appears in the application, in view of common business practice between
insured and agent, to uphold contractual liberty to the extent that the
rule of imputation of knowledge to the principal is abrogated, would not
be in accord with the dictates of good public policy.
ERNEST CHARVAT
'
4 New York Life Ins. Co. v. Fletcher, 117 U. S. 519, 6 Sup. Ct. 837 (1886) held
that it is competent for any party in the negotiation of a contract to limit his powers,
provided the limitation is brought home to the knowledge of the other contracting
party. Here the limitation was also in the application. This is the well settled fed-
eral rule. Provident Mu. Life Ins. Co. of Philadelphia v. Parsons, 70 F.2d 863, 867
(4th Cir. 1934); Fountain & Herrington, Inc. v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. Y., 55
F.2d 120 (4th Cir. 1932)
uSun Ins. Office v. Scott, 284 U. S. 177, 52 Sup. Ct. 72 (1931)
"Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Nance, 12 F.2d 575 (6th Cir. 1926); accord, Northern
Assurance Co. v. Grand View Bldg. Ass'n., 183 U. S. 308, 22 Sup. Ct. 133 (1902).
The concurring opinion in the Hartford case pointed out that it was a question of
estopping the company from voiding the contract, and therefore not a question of
varying a written contract by parol evidence.
'Thus in Rhodes v. Mutual Ben. Health & Acctdent Ass'n., 56 Ga. App. 728, 194
S.E. 33 (1937), knowledge was imputed when the limitation was in the policy, but
when the limitation was also in the application, as in Curry v. Washmgton Nat. Ins.
Co., 56 Ga. App. 809, 194 S.E. 825 (1937), knowledge was not imputed.
"Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Chamberlan, 132 U.S. 304, 10 Sup. Ct. 87 (1889);
Hart v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 47 Cal. App.2d 298, 117 P.2d 930 (1941);
Sternaman v. Metropolitan Life Ins., 170 N. Y. 13, 62 N.E. 763 (1902); Federal
Life Ins. Co. v. Whitehead, 73 Old. 71, 174 Pac. 784 (1918).
" VANcE, INsURANcE 445 (2d ed. 1930); 1 MEcHEM, AGENCY 770(2d ed. 1914)
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